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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J:<'AIRFIELD IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, et al, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
vs. 
M. KENNETH WHITE and 
RALPH M. SMITH, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
12817 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant Fairfield is the owner of the right to 
use 11all" of the water issuing from the Fairfield Springs 
near Fairfield, Utah. Respondent White owns large irri-
gation wells located near the springs. When Respondent's 
wells are pumped, they interfere with (reduce) the flow 
of the Fairfield Springs. Plaintiff's ownership of the Fair-
field Springs and the relationship between the springs and 
respondent's wells were adjudicated by a decree entered 
by the District Court of Utah County on June 1, 1965. 
Defendant White appealed from that decree, but it was 
affirmed. Fairfield Irrigation Co. v. White, et al, 18 Ut. 2d 
93, 416 P. 2d 641. 
This proceeding was initiated by Fairfield's petition 
for an order to show cause. Fairfield asserted that Respond. 
ent was operating his wells without replacing water to the 
spring area, and that this violated Fairfield's rights as 
adjudicated in the 1965 decree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
An order to show cause issued, and a hearing was 
held thereon on October 30, 1970. On January 28, 1972, 
the court entered its order dismissing the petition. Appel. 
lant requested entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, but none was entered. (R. 17) The court did, how· 
ever, in its order dismissing the petition, make a conclu-
sionary finding that Respondent "did not violate the pro-
visions of" the 1965 decree. (R. 16). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have this court determine that the 
manner in which the Respondent is operating his wells 
violates the rights of the Appellant as fixed by the 1965 
Decree. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While the trial court did not enter any findings of 
fact or conclusions of law, and we, therefore, cannot direct 
our comments to the court's findings, we do not believe 
that there is any material dispute in the evidence. 
As we shall presently note in detail, the trial court, 
in 1965, expressly found in its Finding No. 1 (R. 3) and 
expressly decreed in paragraph 1 of the decree (R. 4) that 
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Appellant Fairfield was the owner of the right to use "all" 
of the water issuing from the Fairfield Springs. The court 
also found in Finding No. 13 and decreed in Paragraph 3 
of the decree, that the Respondent's irrigation wells and 
the Fairfield Springs are interconnected, and that the 
pumping of the irrigation wells "directly and immediately 
causes the flow of water from the Fairfield Springs to re-
duce in flow." (para. 3 of the decree) 
In 1964 Respondent White drilled a replacement well 
near the springs for the purpose of replacing water "which 
was otherwise being taken from the Fairfield Springs by 
the pumping of defendant White's wells." The court found 
that this replacement well is also "directly connected to 
the spring, and when it is pumped, the flow of the spring 
decreases." (Finding No. 14) The amount flowing from 
the Fairfield Springs is not constant, even if it were not dis-
turbed by Respondent's pumping, and thus the court in 
Finding No. 2, entered in 1965, found: 
" ... the flow of water from the Fairfield Springs 
varied from a low of 4.10 c.f.s. to a high of 6 c.f .s., 
plus the quantity of water which has flowed through 
a one-inch hole in the headgate located one foot below 
the water surface, and also plus the water utilized 
through a four-inch pipeline to supply domestic water 
for the homes in Fairfield." (Finding No. 2) 
As we will note in more detail below, Respondent 
White appealed from this 1965 decision, but it was af-
firmed. 
-Since the evidence shows, without dispute, that Re. 
spondent White has pumped one of his wells hundreds of 
hours, and that he has not operated his replacement well 
at all. The replacement well leaks 0.12 c.f.s. of water into 
the plaintiff's ditches, but other than for this leak there 
has been no replacement. The evidence in regard to thii 
matter is found in Respondent's answers to lnterrogatoriei. 
(R. 12) Answer 1 shows the hours each month, that Re. 
spondent White has operated one of his irrigation wells 
' 
and then in answer to question No. 2, he states that the re. 
placement well "has not been pumped, but has flowed .12 
c.f.s." into plaintiff's ditches. (R. 12) 
The yield of the spring has been periodically meas· 
ured since 1967, and the measurements are shown in Ex. 
1 (Tr. 13). An engineer, Mr. George A. Lawrence, then 
platted these measurements on graphs (Tr. 19) (Ex. 2-5). 
Ex. 2 consists of six sheets, and shows in graph form the 
periodic measurements from January 15, 1967, until about 
August 10, 1970, which is shortly before the hearing. 
We will not here endeavor to note all of the measure· 
ments for all of the years. We think we can get to the crux 
of the matter by looking at the irrigation season of 1969. 
This is shown on Ex. 3. Across the bottom of Ex. 3 are the 
number of hours that Mr. White said in his answers to 
interrogatories he pumped during each month. Thus, he 
started to pump at 11: 30 a.m. on April 30th, and pumped 
641 hours to May 30th. He did not pump in June. He 
pumped 370 hours in July, 569 hours in August, 612 hour'. 
in September, and 70 hours in October. As a matter ot 
mathematics, there are only 720 hours in a 30-day month, 
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and thus during the irrigation s<:ason of 1969, the evidence, 
without dispute, shows that he pumped one well a major-
ity of the time. The trial court found in 1965 that Mr. 
White has equipped his two irrigation wells to permit him 
to draw 5 c.f.s. from each well. (Finding No. 10.) 
Ex. 3 shows that on April 30, 1969, when according 
to Mr. White's answers to interrogatories, he started to 
pump (R. 12) the springs were yielding 4.8 c.f.s. plus the 
0.12 d.s. leaking from the replacement well. During the 
month of May, Mr. White pumped 641 hours, which 
would be more than 26 full (24-hour) days, and the meas-
urements shown on the graph indicate that the spring was 
pulled down below 3.9 c.f.s. on June 26th (plus the 0.12 
leaking from the replacement well). The measuring de-
Yices there are not so precise (Tr. 29-31) that we would 
contend for a technical violation of the decree in regard 
to a flow of 4.1 c.f .s., which is the minimum amount spe-
cified in the replacement order. (Par. 4 of the decree) What 
we do want to spotlight here is the fact that the spring plus 
the leakage from the replacement well, was nearly 5 c.f.s. 
when Mr. White turned on his pump on April 30, 1969, 
and the springs dropped in flow to or below their 4.1 c.f .s. 
minimum historic low flow, as found by the trial court, in 
1965. Mr. White then shut off his pump, and did not pump 
at all in June. The springs gradually increased in flow, 
to more than 5 c.f.s. by the end of June. (Ex. 3) There are 
fluctuations up and down shown on the graph during the 
month of June, but when the water is changed from Fair-
field's south ditch to its north ditch and back again, a prob-
lem exists in getting an accurate measurement. There is a 
pond which covers the spring area, and since the ditches 
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are different in cle, ation, then~ is alw1ys the possibi!i~· 
in switching the wc:.ter from one ditch to another th, 
at-
water is either being impounded in the pond (and thus 
less than all the water is being measured) or water is bein 
. hd f g 7·1 wit rawn rom storage (and thus the measurements 1.< 
might reflect more than actual yield). (Tr. 30) It, never. ~; 
theless, is clear that the springs were producing (with the :: 
leak from the replacement well) 5 c.f .s. of water on April " 
e. 
30, 1969. Mr. White then pumped for 641 hours, and the ' 
6. 
flow of the spring dropped either to or below 4.1 c.f.s. He e 
quit pumping, and the spring steadily increased in flow to : 
more than 5 c.f .s. ! 
We won't at this point dwell on the evidence on in-
terference, because the trial court adjudicated in 1965 that 
the springs and Mr. White's wells produce water from the 
same source and that when his wells are pumped, the flow , 
of the spring directly and immediately reduces. See para· 
graph 3 of the decree and paragraph 13 of the findings. It 
is thus adjudicated that while he was pumping his well 
641 hours, he was taking water from the springs, and the 
graph simply confirms this. For the convenience of the .' 
court, we reproduce this part of the graph, and submit that 
the evidence conclusively shows that the water represented 
by the shaded part of the graph is water which the spring 
would naturally have yielded, but which Mr. White took 
by pumping his wells. 
This poses the first question: When the spring is na· 
urally flowing substantially in excess of its historic mini· 
mum flow of 4.1 c.f.s., can Mr. White at his sole discretion 
turn on his pumps and take the excess above 4.1 in a 
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critical growing month, like the month of June, and then 
have it replaced later on in the season, either through the 
natural yield of the spring itself of by operating his re-
placement facilities? We assert that replacement should 
be at the same time. If he takes 1 c.f .s. of our water on the 
16th day of June, he should replace it on the 16th day of 
June, and not in October. 
The evidence also conclusively shows that through-
out the irrigation season of 1969, Mr. White pumped one 
well a total of 2262 hours. (Answers to Interrogatories, 
R. 12) The irrigation season is 183 days long. (See Finding 
1) By dividing 24 hours into the total hours pumped, it is 
apparent that he pumped his well the equivalent of 94 
days out of the 183-day season. By the end of the season, 
Ex. 6 shows that the spring had, nevertheless, yielded 1786 
acre feet. Since he didn't pump his replacement well at all, 
it is obvious that but for his pumping, the total yield of the 
spring would have been very substantially higher. We 
cannot know how much, because while he is pumping, the 
equilibrium of the basin is destroyed, and as the Supreme 
Court noted in its opinion affirming the 1965 decree, it is 
impossible while he is pumping to determine with cer· 
tainty what the springs would have yielded. (18 Ut. 2d 
93, 98.) 
This poses the second quesion: When it is clear, as 
we think the evidence is here, that the spring would yield 
substantially more water than 1600 acre feet, if Mr. White 
did not pump, can he, under a decree which awards to us 
all the water of the spring take all of the excess above 1600 
acre feet and make no replacement at all? 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS OF THE FIND-
INGS AND DECREE NEED TO BE CONSTRUED 
TOGETHER AS A HARMONIOUS WHOLE. 
The findings, the decree entered in 1965 and the Su-
preme Court's opinion affirming them are in the file. For 
the convenience of the court, we next set forth some of the 
parts thereof which we think relate to the problem be-
fore us. 
Finding No. 1 finds that the appellant has appropri-
ated 11all" of the water from the springs. It describes the 
winter rights, the livestock watering rights and the do-
mestic rights. The material part is as follows: 
"1. That through usage prior to 1903, the prede-
cessors in interest of the Fairfield Irrigation Com-
pany have appropriated and acquired the right to use 
for irrigation, livestock watering and domestic pur-
poses all of the water flowing from the Fairfield 
Springs and spring area located immediately west 
from the Town of Fairfield, State of Utah .... " 
(Finding No. 1, R. 3) 
Finding No. 2 is the finding about the yield of the 
spring in cubic feet per second and is as follows: 
"2. That prior to the drilling of large irrigation 
wells by the defendant M. Kenneth White . . . the 
flow of water from the Fairfield Springs varied from 
a low of 4.10 c.f .s. to a high of 6 c.f .s., plus the quan-
tity of water, which has flowed through a one-inch 
hole in the headgate located one foot below the water 
surface, and also plus the water utilized through a 
four-inch pipeline to supply domestic water for the 
homes in Fairfield .... " (Finding No. 2 R. 131) 
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The court then makes some findings as to how 111 an1 
acre feet the springs would yield at particular flows J , anu 
states that a flow of 4.1 c.f.s. would produce more than 
1400 feet per season, a flow of 4.5 c.f.s. would produce 
more than 1600 acre feet per season, and that a flow of 
5 c.f.s. would produce more than 1800 acre feet per sea. 
son, in addition to the town supply and livestock water 
through the one-inch hole. 
The court then in the next several findings, finds that 
several of the individual plaintiffs were the owners of in. 
dividual wells, and makes findings concerning the do-
mestic springs. 
In Finding No. 9 the court finds that the defendant 
White drilled two wells, one for 4 c.f.s. and one for 5 c.f.s.; 
that he equipped the wells with pumps and that on Au· 
gust 27, 1964, appellant was producing 10 c.f.s. from the 
two irrigation wells, plus a stock watering well. The court 
found that each well has been equipped to permit Mr. 
White to draw 5 c.f.s. from it. (Finding No. 10) 
The court then found (R. 135, 136): 
"13. That when the defendant M. Kenneth 
White commenced pumping his two large irrigation 
wells in 1962, the pumping caused the flow of the 
Fairfield Springs to drop. That when the White wells 
were turned off toward the end of July, 1962, the 
flow of the spring started in increase, and in 1963, 
under a program of testing undertaken by the State 
Engineer's office the White irrigation wells were kept 
10 
off until a date near the middle of July. That both 
wells were then turned on, and again it was demon-
strated that the wells immediately caused the flow of 
water from the Fairfield Springs to decrease substan-
tially. The wells were shut off, and the flow from the 
springs again increased. The same direct connection 
was again demonstrated through the pumping of Mr. 
White's wells in October of 1963, and throughout 
the season of 1964." 
"14. That in 1964 the defendant M. Kenneth 
White, with permission from the State Engineer, 
drilled a replacement well for the purpose of re-
placing water which was otherwise being taken from 
the Fairfield Springs by the pumping of defendant 
White's wells. That said replacement well is also di-
rectly connected to the spring, and when it is pumped, 
the flow of the spring decreases." 
In Finding No. 16 the court found that by reason of 
the pumping of the wells by the appellant in 1964, 
". . . the flow of the Fairfield Springs dropped 
substantially. That an effort was made to replace the 
water which was taken from the springs by defendant 
White's pumping, but the total yield of water from 
both the replacement well and the springs totalled 
only about 960 acre feet, whereas, the natural flow of 
the springs prior to the drilling of the large irrigation 
wells during the irrigation season would have varied 
between 1,400 and 1,700 acre feet .... " (R. 136) 
The court found (Finding 17 ,) that as a direct result 
of the pumping by the appellant the particular Fairfield 
spring from which the town got its water supply was 
caused to go dry. 
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After thus expressly finding that appellant owned 
"all" of the water issuing from Fairfield Springs, and that 
the pumping by respondent of his wells directly interfered 
with the springs, the court then entered its Finding No. 
26 as follows: 
"26. That the defendant White should also be 
enjoined from pumping his two large irrigation wells 
at any time or during any season, except upon the con-
dition that the water of the plaintiffs be fully re-
placed, with the same quality of water, with the same 
quantity of water, and at the same point where each 
of the plaintiffs now gets his water. That said re-
placement order should specifically require (Emphasis 
added) 
"(a) That the irrigation water from Fairfield 
Springs be maintained at minimum flow of 4.10 cubic 
feet per second through April 20th to October 20th of 
each year, and that the average flow be such as to 
yield not less than 1600 acre feet during said season, 
and that at least 4.5 c.f .s. be maintained therein dur-
ing the approximately 90 days when the ground is 
not frozen between October 20th and April 20th. 
"(c) That the town water pipeline have water 
replaced in it equal to the quantity it would yield 
or convey with a head of 18 inches of water above the 
top of the existing four inch line. That said water 
is in addition to the irrigation water. 
"(d) that sufficient additional water beyond the 
one-inch hole placed through the headgate be added 
to the natural channel to provide livestock water 
in the fields of all the plaintiffs which abut said 
channel. That said water shall be in addition to the 
irrigation and domestic water." (R. 141, 142) 
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Finding No. 29 then provides: 
"That if the White wells, including the replace-
ment well, are pumped in the future to the extent 
they have been pumped in 1962, 1963 and 1964, there 
will be further reduction of ground water pressures 
and the flow of the spring will be further reduced." 
(R. 143) 
The decree expressly confirmed the ownership of 
Fairfield to all of the waters issuing from Fairfield Spring. 
The language of paragraph 1 of the decree is in part as 
follows: 
"1. That the plaintiff Fairfield Irrigation Com-
pany is the owner, through a diligence appropriation, 
of the right to use, for the purposes noted below, 
all of the waters issuing from the Fairfield Springs 
area located immediately west from the town of Fair-
field, and that said water has been since prior to 1903 
used beneficially for irrigation, livestock watering 
and domestic use ... " 
Then follows specific findings about the livestock 
water, the winter use and the domestic use which are not 
presently involved. Paragraph 2 of the decree deals with 
individual wells of individual plaintiffs which are not 
here involved. 
Paragraph 3 of the decree provides: 
"That the pumping of the three wells owned by 
the defendant M. Kenneth White ... produces water 
from the same source and directly and immediately 
causes the flow of the water from the Fairfield 
Springs to reduce in flow .... " 
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After thus expressly finding that appellant owned 
"all" of the water issuing from Fairfield Springs, and that 
the pumping by respondent of his wells directly interfered 
with the springs, the court then entered its Finding No. 
26 as follows: 
"26. That the defendant White should also be 
enjoined from pumping his two large irrigation wells 
at any time or during any season, except upon the con-
dition that the water of the plaintiffs be fully re. 
placed, with the same quality of water, with the same 
quantity of water, and at the same point where each 
of the plaintiffs now gets his water. That said re-
placement order should specifically require (Emphasis 
added) 
"(a) That the irrigation water from Fairfield 
Springs be maintained at minimum flow of 4.10 cubic 
feet per second through April 20th to October 20th of 
each year, and that the average flow be such as to 
yield not less than 1600 acre feet during said season, 
and that at least 4.5 c.f.s. be maintained therein dur· 
ing the approximately 90 days when the ground is 
not frozen between October 20th and April 20th. 
"(c) That the town water pipeline have water 
replaced in it equal to the quantity it would yield 
or convey with a head of 18 inches of water above the 
top of the existing four inch line. That said water 
is in addition to the irrigation water. 
"(d) that sufficient additional water beyond the 
one-inch hole placed through the headgate be added 
to the natural channel to provide livestock wat~r 
in the fields of all the plaintiffs which abut said 
channel. That said water shall be in addition to the 
irrigation and domestic water." (R. 141, 142) 
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Finding No. 29 then provides: 
"That if the White wells, including the replace-
ment well, are pumped in the future to the extent 
they have been pumped in 1962, 1963 and 1964, there 
will be further reduction of ground water pressures 
and the flow of the spring will be further reduced." 
(R. 143) 
The decree expressly confirmed the ownership of 
Fairfield to all of the waters issuing from Fairfield Spring. 
The language of paragraph 1 of the decree is in part as 
foIIows: 
"J. That the plaintiff Fairfield Irrigation Com-
pany is the owner, through a diligence appropriation, 
of the right to use, for the purposes noted below, 
all of the waters issuing from the Fairfield Springs 
area located immediately west from the town of Fair-
field, and that said water has been since prior to 1903 
used beneficially for irrigation, livestock watering 
and domestic use ... " 
Then follows specific findings about the livestock 
water, the winter use and the domestic use which are not 
presently involved. Paragraph 2 of the decree deals with 
individual wells of individual plaintiffs which are not 
here involved. 
Paragraph 3 of the decree provides: 
"That the pumping of the three wells owned by 
the defendant M. Kenneth White ... produces water 
from the same source and directly and immediately 
causes the flow of the water from the Fairfield 
Springs to reduce in flow .... " 
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Paragraph 4 of the decree then enters the replacement 
order, which is quoted above in Finding 26, but the de. 
cree does not repeat part of the language of Finding 26 
which found that White should be enjoined from pumping 
his two large irrigation wells ''at any time, or during any 
season.", except upon condition that "the water of the 
plaintiffs be fully replaced ... with the same quantity of 
water" at the same points where each of the plaintiffs now 
gets his water. The decree does contain the specific pro-
visions of subparagraph (a) and (e) of Finding 26. 
It is our position that subparagraphs (a) through (e) 
were not intended to give Mr. White any interest in the 
Fairfield Springs, nor to amend, subtract from, or limit the 
specific adjudication that Fairfield is the owner of 11all" 
the water from the Fairfield Springs. It has been argued by 
Respondent that the 1600 acre feet figure in the replace· 
ment order was intended to be a finding of the amount of 
water Fairfield could beneficially use. However, Paragraph 
1 of the decree expressly adjudicates that Fairfield has 
since prior to 1903 benefically used all of the water from 
the springs. There is no finding that the springs only yield 
1600 acre feet, but as noted above, the court recited what 
the spring would yield if the flow were at different levels, 
and expressly in that finding refrained from any conclusion 
as to the springs' total flow. This method of handling the 
matter was vigorously challenged by Mr. White when he 
appealed from that decision, and in response we argued 
that there was evidence which would show that the spring 
would haveyieldedmore than 2400acrefeet in 1963. Spe· 
cifically, one of the farmers who had used the entire flow 
14 
--
during his turn on the same piece of land for many, many 
years, had testified that during 1963, when the spring 
yielded about 1237 acre feet (reduced because of Mr. 
White's pumping,) the stream was only about one-half of 
the quantity he had received in past years. In any event, 
the court didn't find in Finding No. 2 that the maximum 
yield of the spring was 1600 acre feet, and it didn't find 
that Fairfield could only use 1600 acre feet beneficially. 
What it did do was find and adjudicate that Fairfield had 
appropriated all of the water from the springs and that 
since prior to 1903 it had beneficially used all of the water 
from springs. It found that the flow of the spring varied 
from a low of 4.1 c.f .s. to a high of 6 c.f.s., and that a 
flow of 5 c.f.s. would yield 1800 acre feet per year. It sim-
ply awarded Fairfield all the water. It found that when 
Mr. White pumps his well, it immediately reduces the flow 
from the springs. It then made a general finding about the 
duty to replace. This finding is No. 26, and it expressly 
says that Mr. White should be enjoined from pumping: 
"at any time or during any season, except upon 
condition that the water of the plaintiffs (which had 
been adjudicated to be all the water from the springs) 
be fully replaced with . . . the same quantity of 
water." 
We think this language prohibits Mr. White from 
taking the water in June and replacing it in October, and 
we think it also prohibits him from taking our water at 
any time or in any season without replacing it. If the sub-
paragraphs which then follow were read entirely by them-
selves, and the specific findings and the specific decree 
provisions noted above are disregarded, it appears that 
15 
Mr. White has no duty, except not to reduce our sprin s 
below their historic minimum flow (4.1 c.f.s.). and th:t 
he can have all the water from the spring above 1600 acre 
feet, but to so interpret these subparagraphs ignores the 
very heart of the problem which caused the litigation. 
We had a very lengthy trial, and the trial was con. 
cerned with the extent of Fairfield's water rights, and with 
the problem of whether the wells interfered with the 
springs. While Fairfield was put to proof about its dili-
gence appropriation, there was never a serious dispute 
about the fact that historically all of the water had been 
used. The court so decreed, and then expressly decreed that 
it had been beneficially used. The big problem was to try 
to prove what the spring in its natural condition has yield-
ed. There were not very many measurements taken before 
the equilibrium of the basin was destroyed by the drilling 
of wells. As the briefs in the previous appeal show, we 
used many types of evidence. We had the testimony of the 
individual farmers about the flow and yield of the spring. 
We had isolated measurements over a rather long period 
of years. We had an observation well maintained by the 
U.S.G.S., and the yield of the spring could be correlated 
with the elevation of water in the observation well, etc., 
and after what we remember as being about a twelve-day 
trial, the court found that the spring had never been below 
4.1 c.f .s. before the equilibrium of the basin had been 
desroyed by drilling. It also found that the springs some· 
times yielded as much as 6 c.f .s. It refused to find in Find· 
ing No. 2 specifically what the spring would yield in acre 
feet, but merely set forth a finding as to the acre feet which 
would be yielded by particular flows. It awarded Fairfield 
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all the water from the springs. It found that Fairfield had 
ber..eficially used all the water from the springs. It found 
that the wells interfered with the spring, and it found ex-
pressly that Mr. White should not be permitted to pump 
at any time or during any season, excepilliJ.pon condition 
that the plaintiffs' water be fully replaced with the same 
quantity of water. 
The evidence here conclusively shows that he simply 
turns his wells on at his own discretion when the flow of 
the spring is greater than its historic minimum of 4.1 c.f .s. 
He has discovered that he can produce his well hundreds 
of hours without reducing the spring below 4.1 c.f .s., and 
then if he shuts off periodically the spring itself in the 
water years we have had since 1967, produces enough 
water to bring the total up to 1600 acre feet by 
October 20th. He thus takes much of the water which the 
spring would have yielded to us, and which we have his-
torically had, in the critical months, and he asserts the 
right to take all of the spring water in excess of 1600 acre 
feet. The more than 2200 hours that he pumped his 5 c.f .s. 
well in 1969 assuredly took substantial amounts of spring 
water, which the court has adjudicated belongs to us, and 
he has made no replacement at all. 
POINT II 
IN CONSTRUING THE DECREE, IT SHOULD BE 
CONSTRUED TOGETHER AS A WHOLE SO AS TO 
GIVE MEANING AND FORCE TO ALL OF ITS 
TERMS. 
The Utah cases uniformly hold that in construing a 
decree, it should be construed together as a whole, so as 
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to give meaning and force to all of its terms. It is also 
proper to look to the findings of fact which support the 
decree. 
One case which is similar on its facts is Ophir Creek 
Water Co. v. Ophir Hill Consol. Mining Co. et al, 61 Ut. 
5 51, 216 P. 490 (192 3). In that case the decree awarded to 
Ophir Creek Water Co. "all of the waters of Ophir Creek." 
The defendant operated a power plant, which during high 
water took part of the water into its pipeline and during 
low water took all of the water into the line. The trial 
court had ruled that whenever there is an overflow at the 
head of the pipe, "'that is to say, whenever the entire flow 
of Ophir Creek" at the intake of the pipe is not being taken 
into the pipeline, then in the operation of its said power 
house, the defendant shall use for the delivery of water 
• from the pipeline upon its water wheel a "nozzle with a 
discharge opening of 2% inches in diameter, and shall at 
all times while such overflow continues, permit at least 
7.5 c.f.s. to flow out of the pipe into the channel." 
The case got back into court on an order to show 
cause why defendant should not be held in contempt. The 
defendant took the position that it had always complied 
with the decree in regard to a 2% inch nozzle for the dis-
charge of the water "just as the decree provides, and that 
was the measure of its duty under the decree." 
In upholding the award of "all of the water of Ophir 
Creek" to the plaintiff irrigation company, and in holding 
that the defendant didn't meet his total duty by complying 
with the express provisions of the decree in regard to a 
2% inch nozzle, the court said: 
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"We have seen in the last-quoted paragraph of 
the decree, above set forth, that the water awarded 
plaintiff, as therein stated, is necessary and essential 
for plaintiff's use. It is manifest, therefore, that the 
purpose and object of the action was to specifically 
determine the rights of each of the parties, especially 
of the plaintiff to a specific quantity of water, and to 
quiet the title thereto. The quantity of water that each 
was entitled to was the principal thing to be deter-
mined. The method or means of discharging the water 
was of secondary importance. It is reasonably clear to 
the mind of the court that it was intended by the de-
cree that appellant should permit 7 .5 second feet of 
water to be discharged from its pipeline and returned 
to the stream whenever the water was not all taken 
into the pipe and there was an overflow at the head." 
In other words, the court had found in its earlier de-
cree that the irrigation company was the owner of all of 
the water from Ophir Creek. During low water, the entire 
creek flow could be taken into the pipeline, but during 
high water, the pipe wouldn't hold all of the water. In 
order to regulate the use of the water by the defendant for 
power, and to honor the decreed right of the plaintiff, 
the court had provided for a discharge of water through a 
2Ys inch nozzle, and the power company had complied 
strictly with the discharge through a nozzle of this size, 
but the plaintiff was not getting the water to which it was 
entitled, and the court said that it is manifest that the pur-
pose of the action was to determine the water rights of 
each of the parties. The quantity of water that each was 
entitled to was the principal thing to be determined. The 
decreed method or means of discharging the water was of 
secondary importance, and would not be controlling. 
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Another case holding that it is necessary in the con. 
struction of a decree to construe the decree as a whole, tak. 
ing into account all of the clauses, and to make them har. 
monious, one with the other, if this can be done, is Salt 
Lake City v. Telluride Power Co., 82 Ut. 607, 17 P. 2d 
281 (1932). Here again the court was being called upon 
to construe an earlier decree entered in 1901, and a sup. 
plemental decree made in 1912. The Supreme Court said 
that to determine the issues raised by the current appeal, 
" ... it is necessary to construe and interpret the 
decree of 1912 .... In construing the decree it is 
proper to refer to the pleadings in the case and the 
issues joined thereunder, in order to explain and limit 
the language used in the decree." 
The court also said that in construing the decree, it 
should be construed together as a whole, so as to give 
meaning and force to all of its terms, and 
"In construing the decree, it should be construed 
together as a whole, so as to give meaning and force 
to all of its terms, and if a reasonable construction 
can be had which will give force to all of its wording, 
such a construction should be made. 23 Cyc. 1101. 
This being so, the only way to give effect to the 
words 'pumped water' would be to construe the two 
paragraphs together.'' 
To the same effect is the more recent case of Hubble 
v. Cache County Drainage District, 123 Ut. 405, 259 P. 2d 
893. Again the court was construing an earlier decree. 
The court quoted from the earlier decree, and said that it 
was necessary to consider the entire decree. It gave particu· 
lar interpretation of it, and said, to hold otherwise "would 
treat as surplusage the word "improvements'". The court 
20 
-then cited Salt Lake City v. Telluride Power Co., supra, 
in support of the proposition that in construing the de-
cree, it should be construed together as a whole, so as 
to give meaning and force to all of its terms, and if a 
reasonable construction can be had which will give force 
to all of its words, such a construction should be made. 
In Huber v. Newman, 106 Ut. 363, 145 P. 2d 780, the 
wording of the judgment, when read by itself, suggested 
that the defendant had to post a bond, without regard to 
whether plaintiff posted one. The conclusions of law, how-
ever, clearly indicated that defendant should post his bond, 
only "after" the court's approval of the plaintiff's bond. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the court held that it was 
necessary to read the conclusions of law and judgment to-
gether. The court said: 
"While the wording in the judgment might sug-
gest that the defendant . . . was required to post an 
indemnity bond . . . whether plaintiffs had posted 
their bond ... the conclusions of law clearly reveal 
that such is not the purpose or effect of the language 
used ... The judgment must be construed in the light 
of the conclusions and must be read and given effect 
as indicated in the language ... "of the conclusions. 
The court has on a number of occasions also held 
that a decree awarding "all of the water of a spring" is 
clear, definite and unambiguous. In Gianulakis v. Sharp, 
71 Ut. 528, 267 P. 1017 (1928), the parties had had a 
previous suit of the same name reported in 63 Ut. 255 P. 
373 0922). The parties agreed that the trial court should 
first determine whether that previous action was res ad-
judicata. The pleadings, findings of fact, conclusions of 
21 
law, decree and opinion of the Supreme Court affirming 
the decree, were all offered and received in evidence. The 
trial court then announced that he thought the issue had 
been adjudicated. On appeal to the Supreme Court in 1928 
one of the contentions was that the former decree entered 
in 1922, which awarded to one of the parties all of the 
water from certain springs was void, for uncertainty. The 
findings recited that there were a number of springs, 
known as Big Springs, the East Springs and other unnamed 
springs located on the described land, and that for more 
than twenty years the plaintiff's predecessor in interest had 
diverted and used "all of the flow of water from each and 
all of said springs." The decree then provided that the de· 
fendant Sharp: 
" ... is the owner and entitled to the use of all 
of the waters flowing from those certain springs 
known as Big Springs, East Springs and other un· 
named springs.'' 
The Supreme Court, at page 533 of the Utah Reports, 
said that there is nothing uncertain about the award of all 
the water from the springs to the plaintiff. It quiets plain· 
tiff's title to all of the water flowing from the springs, and 
enjoins the defendant in that suit from taking any of the 
water of the springs. Then the court said: 
" ... Nothing can be more certain than to decree 
all of the water flowing from certain designated 
springs to one party and perpetually enjoining ~he 
other party from taking any of the water flowwg 
from such springs. This court has so held in the cases 
of Elmer v. McCune, 29 Utah 320, 81 P. 159; Ande~· 
son v. Hamson, 50 Utah 151, 167 P. 254. Nor ca~ tt 
be said that the decree is uncertain as to the period 
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when Sharp is entitled to the use of all the water 
flowing from the springs. All of the waters flowing 
from the springs cannot well be considered to mean 
anything short of throughout the year. If there is any 
uncertainty in the decree in this respect, reference to 
the findings of fact hereinbefore set out makes it dear 
that Sharp was awarded all of the flow of water from 
all of the springs during all of each and every year." 
The two cases cited fully support the above quote from the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
In this case it is manifest that the primary issues were, 
first, plaintiff's ownership of the entire flow of the Fair-
field Springs, and, second, whether the springs and the 
White wells were interconnected so that the pumping of 
the wells would take water from the springs. These are 
the issues raised by the pleadings. They are the issues re-
solved by the Court's Minute Entry and Ruling, and the 
issues resolved by the Findings, Conclusions and Decree. 
They were the issues raised on appeal to the Supreme 
Court. 
The plaintiffs prevailed on these issues, with the 
Court finding in its Findings, and ruling in its Decree, that 
the plaintiffs had appropriated, through usage prior to 
1903 "all" of the waters of the Fairfield Springs. The 
Court also found and decreed that the springs and the 
White wells produced water from the same source, and 
that the wells and the springs were immediately and di-
rectly interconnected, and that the production of water 
from the White wells took water from the springs. 
23 
Finding No. 26 is clear and unequivocal. It states 
that defendant White should be enjoined from pumpin 
his two large wells. g 
" .... a~ any time or during any season, except 
upon cond1t1on that the water of the plaintiff's be 
fully replaced with the same quality of water, with 
the same quantity of water, and at the same point. .. " 
It goes to say what the "replacement order" should re. 
qull'e. 
It is unreasonable to construe the replacement or. 
der as modifying or amending the adjudication which the 
court had made about the rights of the parties. The re· 
placement order recognized the practical fact that if Mr. 
White was pumping the replacement well, which is im. 
mediately adjacent to the springs, and was pumping his 
other large wells, which are interconnected with the 
springs, it would be impossible to know what the springs 
would naturally yield if all the wells were off. It takes an 
average flow of about 4.4 c.f.s. to yield 1600 acre feet in 
the 183 day irrigation season. There is nothing whatever 
in the decree or in the findings even remotely to suggest 
that Mr. White can so manipulate his wells to give us less 
water in the critical growing months than the springs 
would naturally yield. We think that the language of 
Finding 26, which says that he is not to pump his well at 
any time or during any season, unless he fully replaces 
Fairfield's water, prohibits him from doing what he did in 
May and June of 1969, even if the court should hold that 
the replacement provision as to 1600 acre feet is in some 
way a restriction on the quantity of water awarded to us. 
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-There is no sense, and there was no reason for a finding 
that the spring flow varies from 4.1 to 6 c.f .s., if all we 
could have is 4.1. There is no sense in or reason for a find-
ing that 5 c.f.s. of water would yield 1800 acre feet, if in 
all events our right was limited to 1600 acre feet. 
When he isn't making any replacement at all, it is 
res judicata that he takes our spring water when he pumps 
his well. Where the measurements show that the spring 
would be yielding at least 5 c.f.s. if he were not pumping, 
he ought to replace day by day on that basis. It is much 
more beneficial to us to have 5 c.f.s. in June, if nature will 
produce it, than it is to have 4 c.f .s. in June and 6 c.f.s. in 
October. Thus we assert that he must replace, in all 
events, day by day, and acre foot by acre foot, as he takes 
our water. We also assert that it was never intended by the 
specific replacement provisions to subtract from, limit or 
amend the express findings that we are the owners of and 
that we have beneficially used all of the water from the 
Fairfield Springs. The court should have adjudged that 
the prior decree means what it said, to-wit, that we are the 
owners of all of the water of the springs; that we are 
entitled to have the water day by day, as nature would 
produce it; that he cannot take our water in June and re-
place it in October; that he cannot have all of the water 
from the springs in excess of 4.1 c.f .s. whenever he elects 
to take it; and that he was not awarded the right to use all 
of the water from the spring in excess of 1600 acre feet. 
The evidence shows without contradiction, that he has 
pumped his well hundreds of hours since 1967, without 
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replacement. It is res judicata that he has taken our water 
' and without some further order from the court he will con. 
tinue to do so. The conclusionary finding that what he is 
doing does not violate the decree is in error. 
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